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Affording the unaffordable: 
Planning and financing 
sustainable education systems in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Summary 
The first part of this paper sets out briefly some of the basic issues facing education 
policy makers in Africa, including the introduction of school fees and the private 
provision of schools. I argue that there has been insufficient attention paid to how 
policy advice is implemented, and that one of the weakest - if not the weakest - link in 
the chain of policy implementation is the relation between planning and budgeting, 
including how budgets are made. There has been a tendency to put broad educational 
policy objectives on the one hand and the economic planning and management of 
resources on the other into two separate compartments, so that while there is no 
shortage of analysis of what needs to be done, the means of achieving given objectives 
are often unspecified. This has led to unfortunate and self-defeating tensions between 
those who propose policies in international financing agencies and in governments, and 
those who must manage the implementation of these policies. As a result, most 
countries will experience considerable difficulty in implementing simultaneously the 
triple initiatives of expenditure reallocation, improved budget management and system 
expansion. 
Most African public sector budgeting procedures and formats have not changed 
significantly since colonial times, and they cannot cope with translating short and 
medium term adjustment policies into practice. The second part of the paper is 
concerned with approaches to strengthening and/or reforming the planning and 
budgeting for education in African countries. These involve the full or partial 
replacement of annual incremental planning and budgeting systems with approaches 
which may be more appropriate to current problems. I suggest that many attempts to 
undertake necessary reforms have not succeeded because they have been limited to 
interventions in the education sector ministries without reference to government 
budgeting and administration systems as a whole. Reforms should also take full account of the need to strengthen a potentially beneficial relationship between the state 
and the private sector. 
With these improvements better use can be made of external assistance which has, I 
argue, not always served those countries which benefit from it as well as it might have. 
The objective of the changes suggested in this paper is to enable countries to Use their 
limited resources better and avoid stop-go educational development policies in order to 
achieve the capability of providing an education service which is both sustainable and 
affordable. In this respect governments have a crucial role to play in the process of 
change, even if in some aspects the 'market' will succeed where government planning 
has failed. 
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AFFORDING THE UNAFFORDABLE: PLANNING AND FINANCING 
SUSTAINABLE EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
A. Introduction and background 
In many African countries, in spite of public expenditure restraint under various 
programmes of macroeconomic adjustment, there has been a steady increase in 
government expenditure on education. Although public expenditures on education 
expressed as shares of GDP have remained more or less constant, they have declined 
after debt costs are taken into account.1 At the same time average public expenditures 
per student are declining in real terms or are stagnant at low absolute levels because of 
population growth and increased participation. This 'educational stagflation'2 has long 
been recognised, as has the necessity of finding ways of using existing resources more 
efficiently and of augmenting total resources allocated to education derived both from 
tax revenues and 'private' contributions.3 There is a considerable body of literature 
which sets out the appropriate policy targets,4 but severe problems remain. 
However, there has been insufficient attention paid to how policy advice is 
implemented, and one of the weakest - if not the weakest - link in the chain of 
implementation is the relation between planning and budgeting, including how budgets 
are made. Most African public sector budgeting procedures and formats have not 
changed significantly since colonial times, and they cannot cope with translating short 
and medium term adjustment policies into practice. Although the individual citizen's 
'right' to education is now universally accepted, and although governments are obliged 
to respond to the 'social demand' of their populations for education, it cannot be denied 
that the provision of education services absorbs real resources which are limited at any 
given time and which can only achieve in most African countries a modest growth over 
time. There has been a tendency to put broad educational policy objectives on the one hand and the economic planning and management of resources on the other into two 
separate compartments, so that while there is no shortage of analysis of what needs to 
be done, the means of achieving given objectives are often unspecified. This has led to 
unfortunate and self-defeating tensions between those who propose policies in 
international financing agencies and in governments, and those who must manage the 
implementation of these policies. 
This paper explores this problem and some of the solutions proposed to overcome it, 
with particular reference to Sub-Saharan Africa, although many of the observations and 
approaches are equally applicable to South Asian, Caribbean, and Latin American 
countries, as well as some of the former Soviet republics. It is essential that there be 
greater awareness of budgetary, fiscal and macroeconomic issues in the discussions of 
the critical shortage of finance in most African education systems. In this respect 
governments have a crucial role to play in the process of change even if in some aspects 
the 'market' will succeed where government planning has failed.5 
The first part of this paper sets out briefly the basic issues, and discusses some current 
policy recommendations, including the introduction of school fees and the private 
provision of schools. The second part is concerned with approaches to strengthening 
and/or reforming planning and budgeting for education in African countries in order to 
provide a better base for the implementation of policies. These include the replacement 
of annual incremental planning and budgeting systems with approaches which may be 
more appropriate to current problems. I suggest that many attempts to undertake 
necessary reforms have not succeeded because they have been limited to interventions 
in the education sector ministries without reference to government budgeting and 
administration systems as a whole. Reforms should also take full account of the need to 
strengthen a potentially beneficial relationship between the state and the private sector. 
With these improvements better use can be made of external assistance which has, I 
argue, not always served those countries which benefit as well as it might have. The 
objective of the suggested changes is to enable countries to use their limited resources 
better and avoid stop-go educational development policies in order to achieve the 
capability of providing education which is both sustainable and affordable. 
There are a number of factors which influence the planning and financing of sustainable 
education systems, and they include-, 
(a) demographic factors 
(b) national economic performance, including the structure of the 
economy, degree of industrialisation and rural/urban economic activity, 
unemployment, the distribution of income, etc (c) external assistance and levels of external debt 
(d) patterns of previous provision and 'social demand' 
(e) external advisers and external 'models'
(a) Demographic Factors 
The growth of population in most African countries has resulted in an accelerating 
demand for basic education, and, as a natural consequence, for higher levels of 
education. In general this growing demand has exceeded the rate of growth of resources 
available to satisfy it. Although the ratio of the 0-14 age groups to the 15-64 age groups 
in low income countries is predicted to fall (from an average of about 40-50 per cent in 
1989 to 30 to 40 per cent by 2025), implying an increase in the size of the population of 
working age, the ratio of taxpayers to non-taxpayers is likely to remain much lower 
than that found in developed countries for some time to come, while the structures of 
the growing education services in less developed countries which are mainly financed 
out of tax revenues are arguably comparable to those of the more developed countries. 
At the same time the rate of urbanisation will effect the delivery of education because 
of the different characteristics of urban schools. 
(b) National Economies 
The level of industrialisation in different countries is an important aspect of the nature 
of the relationship between education and training systems and the employment 
markets. In this sense 'levels' of industrialisation refer to a continuum with pre-
industrial countries (Africa, South Asia) at one end, moving through light and heavy 
industry to high technology industry at the other end. For example, countries such as 
Korea with high and growing quality control in industry require a very different 
approach and education content from countries with negligible industry and little drive 
for quality control. Countries dominated by low skilled rural employment differ from 
those with high skilled urban employment. Countries where school and university 
leavers are likely to be employed within a reasonable time after graduation have very 
different relations between education systems and labour markets from those with high 
rates of unemployment. At all levels of development trainability is a prized factor 
among employers, but in more industrialised countries basic school education and 
trainability are extremely important: without these attributes new entrants to the labour 
force can quickly become marginalised.6 In pre-industrial countries marginalisation 
may take place irrespective of education and training simply because of insufficient 
employment opportunities in relation to the number of qualified applicants. 
The issue of job creation is crucial. Increased public investment in the expansion of education systems may mean less resources devoted to job creation: the Pacific rim 
countries have demonstrated the strong potential role of governments in this area.7 
Expansion of education in economies with restricted employment opportunities may not 
always be the most appropriate use of government resources.8 Industrial growth in 
Africa will be limited, and while formal education will play a direct part in this growth, 
it will be also significant in terms of indirect influences such as on the redistribution of 
income,9 and as a base for specialised training. Although some10 insist that the state 
should not play a direct part in providing finance for training, experience from Asian 
countries suggests that there is a case for the state doing so.11 
(c) External Assistance and Public Debt 
Countries in Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America which have recently 
experienced a decline in their economies suffer from falling or stagnant tax revenues, 
and therefore from a decreasing ability to provide additional public domestic finance 
for growing public services.12 In order to support the increased claims on public 
spending, in some countries foreign aid has assumed such significant proportions that 
education systems are largely supported by it.13 The data conceal the volumes of 
external aid supporting education systems, which may be proportionally larger than in 
other sectors, and also conceal the varying applications of aid within different parts of 
education systems. 
Donors have put considerable pressure on African countries to accept financial and 
technical assistance to develop their education systems.14 Yet the relation between 
external funding and domestic capacity to pick up the resultant capital repayment and 
interest costs as well as the associated recurrent and capital replacement costs has 
consistently been ignored, or if not ignored, it has been assumed that economic growth 
will take care of the problem. There have been many attempts to quantify the finance 
gaps, from the millions of dollars needed in the 1960s to reach 'takeoff' to the UNICEF 
attempt to show how much is needed to provide basic education for all.15 
In principle, the argument runs, the combination of the extension of education provision 
and other externally financed investments will accelerate growth and development and 
also fulfill basic requirements and entitlements, justified on moral grounds. However, 
whatever the longer term effects, the expansion of education systems has demanded a 
rapidly growing share of fiscal resources while tax revenues cannot keep pace with the 
increased demands. The resultant decline in the quality of public provision has meant 
that it is no longer possible to take indices such as examination results and enrolment 
rates as indicators of returns to this public investment. For example, a common 
structure of an education system is a primary-secondary-tertiary cycle which may cover 
15 years altogether. If a six year primary education cycle is characterised by illiterate 
school leavers it must be concluded that there is something inappropriate about such a system. If schools lack books, equipment and decent buildings and furniture, the 
reasons for their very existence is in question. 
Encouraged by the Jomtien conference, most of the current literature which considers 
education finance appears to start from the premise that schooling for all (SPA) by the 
year 2000 is an axiomatic objective.16 There are parallels with the commitment to 
Universal Primary Education (UPE), which was promoted often with little real regard 
for resource requirements. The global objectives are endorsed by governments, which 
are encouraged to aim for them and are promised external finance to support their aims. 
Governments themselves seem to have had little real confidence that they could make 
sufficient resources available. There should by now be sufficient experience to realise 
that these targets are not attainable, and, more importantly, that trying to attain them 
through heavy doses of foreign aid leaves major problems of sustainability. 
The amount of public finance available for spending on education has been severely 
affected by the volume of the interest costs of government debt which have first claim 
on fiscal revenues. However, over the period of adjustment in many countries the 
volume of government expenditure has risen slowly in real terms. Social sector 
spending has also risen,17 but because of the requirement on governments to service 
debts the rate of increase of public expenditure is limited. 
The significance of the combined influences on education of the growth and 
distribution of population, recession, and rising interest payments, has not only reduced 
the extent to which tax derived public expenditures can support the growing demand for 
services: they have also affected the availability of private finance, that is, the total 
resources available. On the government side, the debt burden combined with population 
growth has rendered many governments' attempts to cope with the social sectors a 
Sisyphean task. One of the difficulties which face policy makers and sectoral aid donors 
in Africa in the near term is how to judge the debt problem: much foreign aid would be 
unnecessary were debt to be cancelled because it would allow more domestic finance to 
be reallocated for education.18 On the private side, as public sector provision, which is 
a function of economic capacity, declines, households are forced to contribute more of 
their own resources through fees and other types of tax, though in many cases there 
may be very little surplus in the household budgets. 
(d) Advisers and External 'Models' 
Educators from developed countries have generally not accepted that education systems 
may develop through 'stages', and that these 'stages' reflect the capacity of a country to 
provide a reasonable quality of education to its citizens within its resource 
constraints.19 A aucial factor in many countries has been the role of foreign advisers 
whose advice has been supported by large sums of foreign aid.20 Their influence has been compounded by the demonstration effects of the education systems of developed 
countries: these systems evolved over many years largely on the basis of their close 
relationship to employment markets. Countries which are 'late developers' have 
imported wholesale foreign techniques and institutions, including examination systems 
which have become the main linkage between schooling and restricted employment 
markets, dominating both.21 Although there were many who were well aware of the 
growing tendency of foreign aid to promote the 'western' norms of the quantitative 
evaluation and assessment of extrinsic educational characteristics,22 there has over the 
years been a tendency to promote the expansion of education systems by making them 
more complex and 'modern' without concomitant attention to assessment reform. This is 
analogous to the heavy promotion of better seed varieties and husbandry practices for 
peasant farmers while ignoring the issues of crop pricing and marketing. 
(e) Patterns of Previous Provision 
One of the main constraints on reform policy is the expectations and aspirations 
generated by the provision of education and training in the recent past. The 
determinants of this provision are complex and include cultural and social, as well as 
political and economic, factors. This paper does not explore this aspect in detail, partly 
because of its complexity, and partly because there are significant variations between 
countries. A principal manifestation of popular aspirations to education is in the 
sensitivity of political authorities to current 'social demand' and the resulting reluctance 
of governments to take difficult decisions on the basis of the long view rather than of 
short-term concerns. There are wide differences in patterns of previous provision 
between countries. Some have had large university sectors (at least in terms of their 
budget shares), while others chose not to develop post-primary education. Attitudes to 
girls' education vary between countries, as do local communities' attitudes to 
participation in schools. The status of teachers also varies. Some countries have over 
the years developed strong elements of private provision. In response to 'social 
demand', existing government budgeting and planning further consolidate short term 
incremental planning, reflecting a seemingly inexorable and immutable progress on the 
basis of past trends and views. The changes that need to be made are in many cases so 
large that it can be difficult to see where to start and how they can be implemented. 
Major differences between countries in this respect dilute the value of 'global' 
prescriptions. 
I have, in this introduction, sought to suggest that there is little reason to assume 
optimistically that the approaches of the last two decades will be appropriate for the 
next decade, a position which is directly contrasted to that of the Jomtien conference 
and the view that resources will be made available through the combination of 
efficiency measures and foreign aid in a period of growth in the nineties. The 1990s are 
now a third completed, and there is little evidence that the necessary steps are being 
taken quickly enough, if at all. The cumulative effect of the factors summarised in this section is to force the conclusion that the environment for education development in 
many countries is hostile to progress, and likely to remain so. 
The main differences between education policies which were most widely advocated in 
the 1970s and the first half of the 80s, and those now widely proposed by international 
agencies and others, arguably relate to the role of the 'market'. Much of the literature on 
reform is based on assumptions about 'the market', and on how reducing the role of 
government can create competition and therefore efficiency. Cost recovery and 
privatisation are often regarded not only as means of augmenting resources, but also as 
sufficient conditions for greater efficiency. There is at the same time a general 
acceptance of the desirability of Schooling for All (SFA), just as there was of Universal 
Primary Education, and (SFA), is widely enshrined in public education plans. These are 
essentially and inevitably long term objectives and do not address the problems which 
we currently face. 
This paper tries to steer a way between the Scylla of the market and the Charybdis of 
Jomtien. I express scepticism both about market solutions and about the feasibility of 
significant expansion of education systems, at least in their present forms. While the 
Jomtien objectives are desirable in principle, the first step must be to do what we can to 
ensure that governments are capable of managing the reforms in many African 
countries. This in itself will take up the rest of this decade.
B. Resources, costs and data 
It is important to distinguish between educational expenditures and educational costs, 
and to relate them both to a given product. Analysis of education systems can be 
misleading because of the failure to make these distinctions. This is exacerbated by the 
inadequacies of data. In that policy prescriptions can have wide-ranging effects, it is 
most important that they are made on as full an information base as possible. The 
purpose of this section is to define briefly the appropriate terms for subsequent analysis. 
(a) Education Expenditures 
Budgeted and Actual Expenditures. Expenditures are actual money outlays. It is 
necessary for the analyst to distinguish between budgeted expenditure on the one hand 
and actual expenditure on the other: actual expenditures include household and other 
non-government expenditures. A common error in education finance analysis is the 
assumption that budgeted expenditures equate to actual expenditures. This is partly 
because the standards of public accounting in many countries are very poor, and only 
budgeted expenditures are available in the public domain. Publication of actual 
expenditures, which are often incomplete, is usually at least two years after the end of the fiscal year,23 and budget estimate books commonly have three types of analysis: 
actual expenditure (present minus two years), revised budget estimates (last year) and 
budget estimates for the current year. In that the expenditures can be as much as 30 per 
cent over or under the estimates, the use of budget data as a proxy for expenditure is 
particularly misleading. 
Total Expenditure Estimates. Another common feature of education analysis is the 
presentation of tables showing 'total expenditure on education', which normally, of 
course, show only total government (often budgeted) expenditure, sometimes of the 
Ministry of Education only. Firstly, household expenditure is a major component of 
total expenditure: at the primary level, for example, household direct expenditure on 
education can equal and indeed surpass government expenditures. Secondly, most 
education budget estimates fail to include the interest costs of capital and project 
expenditures, whether financed by loans, grants, or 'own' funds. Thirdly, in many 
countries external assistance, which may not be included in the government budget, can 
substantially increase total expenditures. Fourthly, it is well known that public 
expenditures on education and (more so) on training are made in many other ministerial 
sectors apart from education. These omissions or inaccuracies can result in substantial 
underestimates of actual expenditures. 
(b) Education Costs 
While costs to the economist are a measure of what has to be given up to achieve 
something, to the accountant they are money outlays (except for depreciation). 
Economic costs are made up of direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are usually money 
expenditures. Where average, or unit, direct costs are analysed, they often refer only to 
public expenditure divided by the appropriate unit, usually enrolments, at a given point 
in time for a given level of educational provision. The total direct costs of education 
exceed the levels of expenditure by governments, and the excess is borne by households 
and firms. To define the direct costs it is necessary to specify at the same time what is 
actually being purchased. 
The difference between the actual expenditures and the (estimated) direct costs of 
providing a reasonable quality and quantity of education is the level of under-funding.24 
For example, the costs of production of books can be more or less estimated, a 
'reasonable' level of teachers' salaries can be proposed based on various measures and 
indices, building costs are usually known within, say, a 20 per cent variation for any 
given design, and the maintenance of pupils, teachers, materials, equipment and 
buildings can be estimated within an acceptable level of tolerance. If we then buy what 
we understand as 'education' but in fact receive something different, we have purchased 
a different product, and its costs are not those of 'education'. If we say that we are 
buying 'education' we expect that what we are buying will serve its intended purpose. In this sense education expenditures do not equate to education costs in this particular time 
period. 
Total cost, however, is a wider concept, and includes the costs to society as a whole, 
usually termed 'social costs'.25 The measurement of what has to be given up to purchase 
education is complex. The most widely analysed indirect cost is the 'opportunity cost' to 
individuals and households, that is, the alternative uses to which they could have put the 
resources had they not invested them in education. Less widely analysed are the 
opportunity costs of government expenditure and of external assistance. External 
assistance can promote inefficiency, as in the case, for example, of 'tied aid', where 
recipient governments are obliged to purchase goods and services from the 'donor' 
country even though these goods and services might be more expensive than suitable 
alternatives available from other sources. Another social cost which is little analysed 
the cost of tax finance. Raising and administering taxes require expensive 
bureaucracies. In most countries tax systems discriminate against the poorer sections of 
the population, or they encourage the inefficient use of resources. Finance raised 
through such systems has significant social costs. While we are mainly concerned with 
government expenditures and the planning of the education sector, it is necessary to 
bear in mind the nature and scope of costs of provision of education, as we will see 
later. 
(c) Data 
The education system analyst requires three categories of basic data, 'physical' data 
relating to enrolments and other quantities, financial data relating to costs and 
expenditures, and economic data relating to the economy as a whole. Interpretative data 
are derived from these basic data, such as enrolment rates, average expenditures and 
other ratios 
National Income Accounting. At the apex of the data structure national income 
accounts are frequently drawn upon for policy prescriptive purposes. The unreliability 
of national accounts is well known, but despite this they continue to be widely used, for 
example, in comparing government education expenditure as a ratio of GDP between 
countries, and in advocating that expenditure on education reach a given level, say 5 per 
cent, of GDP. In these cases the numerators and the denominators of the ratios are so 
unreliable that the resulting ratios are of little use, especially for comparative 
purposes.26 
Public Budgets. The next commonly used aggregate financial interpretative data are 
educational expenditures expressed as proportions of public expenditure. The most 
frequent failure in considering these data is the need to distinguish between 
discretionary and non-discretionary expenditure. Interest payments on government debt are a priority obligation in government expenditure. Sectoral budgeted expenditures are 
therefore secondary claims, and government has discretion on allocation. Total 
discretionary budgeted expenditure is therefore total budgeted expenditure after 
provision for local and foreign government debt repayments is made.27 Many analysts 
cite ratios which use total budgeted expenditure as the denominator, and it is not always 
clear from published statistics whether debt obligations are included or not in the total 
recurrent budget estimates. Some countries have been expected by international 
institutions to raise sectoral shares because of confusion of discretionary and total 
expenditures. If the 'gross' ratio of education expenditure to total recurrent expenditure 
(including debt repayment) falls over time it is difficult to determine whether the fall is 
because of increased debt repayments or because government policy is to reduce 
expenditure on education. The debt issue cannot be overemphasised and is discussed 
further below in relation to capital budgeting and foreign aid. 
The next key issue is the composition of education budgets. Different countries include 
different items, and Ministry of Education budgets do not include all budgeted 
expenditures on education in many countries, particularly those in which education 
management responsibilities are devolved on local government or federal state 
ministries. It is often difficult to determine the total public budgeted expenditure on 
education because of the variety of data sources that must be consulted.28 Published 
and easily available data within countries rarely provide information on education 
finance which is useable for detailed analysis. Few government Statistical Abstracts and 
Digests include budgetary data. 
Capital Budgets. A major data weakness is capital budgets, which are often very 
misleading since many contain recurrent elements and omit foreign grant and loan 
contributions. The servicing of foreign loans is to be found in a consolidated budget, 
and does not form part of sectoral budgets, although there is a case for them to be 
recorded there. Capital budgeting is discussed later. 
Educational Cost Benefit Analysis. A final point should be made about rate of return 
analysis. The use of internal rates of return to education has been vigorously promoted 
over the last fifteen years, and has had a great influence on education policy, although 
the reported historic 'high' rates of return have not been reflected in many cases in 
overall national economic performance. The technique has many serious flaws, most of 
them being well known (such as its inability to take quality into account29, and the 
equation of differences in earnings with the effects of education on productivity), some 
less so (such as the true extent of costs and benefits, including social costs and 
benefits30, and externalities31). Internal rate of return to 'education' calculations are 
without doubt subject to serious upward and downward bias (which may not, contrary 
to the suggestions of some writers, cancel out), yet the findings, surprisingly calculated 
to a single decimal point, are invariably used to justify the emphasis of public investment on primary education. The use of cost benefit analysis for education policy 
making is not the subject of this paper, but it has had important effects on education 
planning and budgeting. In reality, it takes many years to redirect public expenditure 
from one level of the education system to another, during which time relative internal 
rates of return may alter between levels for several reasons, including their dependence 
on average wages of school leavers which may change rapidly in a short time.32 As 
such a redirection may imply the introduction of fees and private education, of which 
there is little experience in many countries, there are major political and social issues at 
stake. While cost-benefit analysis in principle provides important policy data, in 
practice the potential for significant error suggests that evidence of internal rates of 
return to schooling should be used with circumspection, if at all, particularly in 
countries with low school quality.
C. Alternative sources of education finance 
Although it is by now universally recognised that public education systems in most 
African, South Asian, Caribbean and Latin American countries are severely 
underfunded in relation to what they are trying to achieve, the mechanisms for 
improving efficiency are not in place. Progress can only be made if planning and 
budgeting are improved, and this cannot happen while ancient and inappropriate 
government financial and planning approaches and systems remain. In general, 
governments must follow one or both of two types of policy to improve the quality and 
level of provision of education. On the one hand existing resources must be used more 
efficiently, and on the other resources must be augmented. A necessary condition for 
both must be the development of realistic budget and expenditure control systems for 
all government expenditures which work hand in hand with better planning. 
The necessity of a public subsidy to education is justified by the presence of constraints 
on private credit (individuals often cannot borrow to finance education); imperfections 
in the availability of information (parents may systematically underestimate the value 
of education because of lack of information); externalities (such as the apparent relation 
between length of primary schooling and reduced fertility rates); and the public good 
aspect of education. Public goods are goods which, because they cannot be withheld 
from one individual without withholding them from all, must be supplied communally. 
Access to basic education might qualify as a public good. The presence of any of these 
conditions indicates 'market failure', and as they are all to a greater or lesser degree 
applicable to education, subsidies to the provision of education services can be justified 
on economic grounds. At the same time, funds for education, whether from tax or non-
tax sources, are not infinite, and will always be rationed. The case for providing a fully 
subsidised service is thus undermined by the inability of net fiscal sources (ie taking 
also into account direct and social costs incurred in providing subsidies out of taxation) 
to satisfy the social optimum, taking into full account the various external benefits to education. Even were sufficient funds to be available to support a fully subsidised 
system, bureauaatic inefficiency in unaccountable education services leading to 
'government failure,'33 would have to be taken into account. A balanced approach is 
therefore needed. 
Efficiency. Much of the literature considers the option of reducing unit costs.34 But 
improvements in efficiency can take place, with or without reductions in unit costs. If 
we use the average cost per student as a measure of efficiency, then clearly costs may 
be reduced by reducing the quality of the product. It is difficult to see how average 
costs can be reduced in many African countries without further deterioration in the 
system. Some components of average expenditures should be reduced, but should result 
in transfers to other components in order to increase average expenditures per pupil or 
teacher. This is contrary to the view of those who believe that the greater role of the 
market permits governments to save money.35 The problem for the public sector is to 
raise average expenditures within the constraint of existing total public expenditures: 
and for the education system as a whole, total and average expenditures must be 
increased within the constraint of net additional private resources. 
Embedded in the proposition that unit costs can be reduced is the inescapable need for 
the scope and volume of publicly financed activities to be reduced. 'Efficiency' 
measures will yield some transferable funds in the form of available cash. This is 
important. For example, many education projects have had as their stated aim the 
increase in pupil-teacher ratios in order to reduce the total number of teachers, the 
resulting 'savings' then to be applied to other parts of the sector. In reality, under the 
usual budgeting systems, what savings that are made are rarely identifiably transferred 
in the form of extra cash for, say, books. They are translated into a reduced rate of 
growth of the education budget: increments on non-salary charges are held at the 
'normal' rate. In the context of extreme underfunding it is not clear how significant such 
transfers will be. Sources of additional funding will tend to be found outside the normal 
tax system in the foreseeable future. 
The 'liberalisation' of the education market, the encouragement of private schools and 
the formalisation of cost-recovery schemes are expected to go a long way to bridge the 
finance gap. Most countries expect a growing proportion of total expenditure on 
education to come from non-fiscal sources. The main point to be made at the policy 
level is how far user fees can and should augment, and how far substitute for, public 
resources, assuming, of course, no deterioration in the quality of the product. There is 
relatively little evidence on which to base confident predictions of the extent to which 
expenditures on education can be increased through allowing a market in education 
service provision to develop. The development of such a 'market' would be through (a) 
the introduction and expansion of 'user fees'; (b) the expansion of the private education 
sector; and (c) the greater use of non-government sources of specific goods and services. 
(a) User Pees end 'Cost-Sharing' 
It seems to be widely accepted that subsidies should be focused on primary education, 
and that the higher up the system the lower the subsidy should be.36 However, because 
of higher costs, the ratio of subsidy to private contribution generally increases the 
higher up the education pyramid a student climbs.37 Whereas direct parental 
contributions finance up to half or in some cases even more of the total expenditure at 
the primary level, this share falls rapidly at the public secondary level. At the university 
level direct and indirect parental contribution as a proportion of total expenditure is 
often very slight. In order to reduce the burden of subsidy at higher levels many 
countries have introduced compulsory fees for secondary and tertiary education.38 
User fees may replace government subsidies to education, they may augment them, or 
they may partly replace and partly augment at the same time. Most proponents of fees 
assume that fees should and will augment total expenditures. In general it seems that 
the approach proposed by Thobani39, which has influenced the thinking of international 
agencies involved in education, is most widely accepted: fees should be increased so 
long as there is 'excess demand' for the service. As I have noted, however, deterioration 
in the education system changes the product and 'excess demand' has little meaning. 
Excess effective private demand for 'education' as a service which will clearly benefit 
its 'users' by enabling them to learn will not be observed because of this. In a number of 
African and South Asian countries parents are withdrawing their children from school 
because of poor quality and because they do not consider schooling relevant to their 
needs. 
Clearly, where there is substantial underfunding combined with deteriorating quality, 
gains from increased user fees may generate resources for expansion and quality 
improvement, and add significantly to total resources expended on education. However, 
it is not at all evident that sufficient attention is given to substitution effects. If 
household budget ceilings are fixed, the requirement to pay fees could well mean that 
money which had previously been spent on children and schools (for example, on 
books and construction), would be switched to fee payments, and parents would expect 
a greater level of public provision to provide what they themselves had previously 
provided. This means that no augmentation of total expenditure on education would 
take place. Similarly, little is known about the opportunity costs of fees paid by the 
'rich' for higher education, though much is written about the need to lower taxes to 
promote investment by the 'rich'. 
It is thus necessary to distinguish between compulsory fees and voluntary contributions, 
and to understand the degree of substitutability between them. Where compulsory fees are concerned, a distinction must be made between fees collected by the school and 
used in the school, and those collected and administered centrally. Compulsory fees are 
in effect 'earmarked' taxation, that is, taxes collected for a specific purpose,40 where 
they are for compulsory education. As I have noted, taxation has its own associated 
costs, and therefore the result of charging fees which cause households to transfer 
expenditure from direct voluntary contributions to compulsory fees could result in a net 
decrease in education expenditure due to the costs of fee collection and administration. 
In addition, many fee proposals may not have sufficiently considered the effect on 
households of the combination of user charges and the tax system. The collection of 
fees and non-fee contributions for compulsory education outside the tax system, either 
through coercion or through deliberate starvation of subsidies forcing up private 
contributions, can increase the regressive nature of the tax system.41 
Two broad justifications are commonly advanced for 'cost-sharing' policies. The first is 
that governments have insufficient revenue expenditure to finance education services 
fully; and the second is that a decreased reliance on 'government' revenues will promote 
competition and therefore efficiency. In so far as 'cost-sharing' in education has any 
meaning at all it refers to the sources of finance for education. Sources may be 
discretionary or non-discretionary for both household and government budgets. Both 
governments and households have limitations on what resources they can budget for 
any given activity. For individuals and households there are three types of 'cost-
sharing': (a) voluntary contributions; (b) obligatory charges which do not go into 
government revenues but are retained, for example, at the school; and (c) obligatory 
charges which go into government revenues. Voluntary contributions may be correctly 
considered as cost-sharing while obligatory charges must be considered as taxes. 
However, where government allows for a certain level of 'voluntary' contribution by 
deliberately reducing subsidies, even voluntary contributions become obligatory. 
The basic question is what affects the relative levels of voluntary and obligatory 
expenditures. Taxes and compulsory fees paid by individuals are obligatory (non-
discretionary) they must be paid - and hence there is no essential distinction to be made 
between them. Where fees are used directly for a specifically identified purpose, unlike 
most taxes which go into a common pot, they may be considered as earmarked, but they 
are nevertheless obligatory. 'Cost-sharing' does not therefore signify a division of 
financing responsibility: revenues still derive from citizens. Rather it signifies a 
redistribution of financing shares. 
The basic relation between public expenditures on education on the one hand and direct 
payments households may make apart from their normal tax obligations on the other is 
that the payments that households make are generally residual, that is, after public 
subsidies are taken into account citizens are asked to-make up any shortfalls. There is therefore a clear relationship between public sector efficiency and the level of 'private' 
contribution: parents may be required to pay more to support government or private 
sector inefficiency. How can I, as a parent, influence the costs of the education which I 
am obliged to cover, directly or indirectly, whether for public or private education, if I 
want my children to be educated? Can I say 'reduce the number of subjects so at least 
some are well-resourced'; or 'in our school we can't afford all the teachers we are 
allocated'; or 'change the school year and modify the examination system to fit into the 
fishing calendar so my children can help in the fishing season'? I can't, of course. The 
whole construct of the 'market' is that it creates competition and choice, but it is 
obvious to nearly every parent, particularly those without much money, that in reality 
there is not much choice, and hardly any at all where the determinants of the costs of 
education are concerned. 
There is a major need for research into the relation between the costs of schooling and 
how people can pay them. At the household level expenditures may be made from 
current income, from borrowing, and from sales of assets. Nearly all surveys of 
household expenditure assume expenditures to be from current income. But if the sum 
total of current income is insufficient to cover household expenditures, whence comes 
the income to make up the difference? It must come from debt or from sales of assets. If 
it comes from other members of the extended family it may come from current income, 
or from debt, or from sales, but in aggregate the total incomes and expenditures must 
balance. 
Assets such as cows or taxis earn income. It may make sense to sell them if they 
finance higher yielding assets, rather than if they finance consumption. If households 
sell assets to finance education, assuming education to be investment and not 
consumption (many, if not most, surveys treat education expenditure as consumption 
expenditure), it is, in effect, a switch of investments out of cows or taxis into human 
capital. Thus, where individuals are required to purchase education, it is necessary to 
understand the sources of finance used for the purchase. If I believe my children will 
earn more from having attended school, the additional future earnings might enable me 
to buy two cows or two taxis, and my short-term hardship might be justified. If in fact 
they do not earn sufficient to have made my sacrifice worth while, I have made a 
serious loss. Moreover, society has also made a loss. 
In the past budget deficits were financed by government borrowing and foreign aid. In 
principle there is nothing wrong with a deficit as long as people are willing to finance 
them. As governments are no longer able and/or willing to finance deficits, households 
and firms are being asked to do so. If individuals wish to receive education and an 
academic certificate they will have little choice but to pay increasing levels of fees, 
regardless of the efficiency of government provision. This is the logic of the Thobani 
'rule'. As I have mentioned, the argument is that at the primary level parental contributions 
should in general augment public resources, while progressively at the higher levels 
they may to some degree substitute for public resources, but in order to redirect the 
resources to basic education. In reality, this is hard to achieve. Higher government 
expenditure on primary education might, for example, enable poor households to 
release money used to finance education for other equally important uses. Furthermore, 
in countries where equity considerations are important in policy making, it is possible 
that focused subsidies such as scholarships will reduce net revenues from fees, as the 
costs of subsidies are balanced against the extra revenue from fees.42 Where fees 
substitute for public finance, it is assumed that the public finance thus released will be 
returned to the education sector in other areas. This, as I have noted, is one of the basic 
justifications underlying fee proposals such as those found in the cited World Bank 
literature,43 but it is by no means clear from this literature that it actually happens. I 
suggest that it is unlikely to happen in the absence of appropriate planning and 
reformed budgeting systems. 
(b) Private Educational Provision 
Much of Africa's 'modern' education system up to independence was private in the 
sense that it was run by missionaries. The secularisation of education and the perceived 
need for nation-building, as well as in some cases political activities of churches, led to 
an almost total take-over of educational institutions by governments. Missionary 
schools were not profit-making, but aimed for self-sufficiency, depending on local and 
foreign contributions. 
The reasons for encouraging the development of private schools in less developed 
countries generally lie with the inability of governments to provide sufficient student 
places from tax finance. Like fees, it is a way of capturing more private finance outside 
the tax system. This is deemed to be more efficient in the sense that it avoids the costly 
public bureaucracy necessary to administer the public system. However, it is necessary 
to take into account the costs of regulation.44 At the same time private schools, 
particularly in that they operate for the most part within education systems in Africa 
which are geared to getting pupils through examinations, may, if left sufficient 
flexibility, serve as centres of innovation, even to the point of shortening the length of 
the primary or secondary school cycle with no loss of examination success. The 
European experience, particularly in Scandinavian countries, provides interesting 
examples of this phenomenon. 
There is an important distinction to be made between profit-making and non-profit 
private schools. In the case of private profit-making schools there is no reason to 
suppose an equally proportional relationship between rises in household spending on 
schooling and total expenditure on education because of the profit which school owners take out. It is thus by no means axiomatic that the replacement of public schools by 
private schools will result in an equal augmentation of resources, particularly when 
regulation costs are taken into account.45 
The privatisation of education may not necessarily favour the better off by the creation 
of elite private schools access to which is restricted by price, as is often believed. There 
may be significant incentives to compete for subsidised school places, which are 
allocated on entry requirements which include academic performance as measured by 
examinations. Examinations have distorted education systems and equated examination 
passes with education. To the extent that there is a relation between examination 
success and relative social advantage, examinations become a rationing device for 
future study, and favour the better off in their search for publicly subsidised school 
places. More importantly, whatever the economic status of students, those with lower 
academic achievement, which is not the same as saying those with less academic 
ability, may have less access to good schools.46 
There is undoubtedly an important role to be played by private schools in African 
countries. How important remains to be seen. Private schooling should not be seen as a 
panacea, and its potential as a future demand on government obligations under multi-
part systems must be borne in mind: where private schools may suffer financial 
problems there may be strong calls for government help.47 Private systems are often 
subsidised directly or indirectly, and may account for a proportionately larger 
percentage of total expenditure than of total enrolments. Indeed, the real issue is how 
subsidies to 'private' schools are operated, as in most countries they operate through the 
tax system or directly though grants. In many ways it is unhelpful to be constrained by 
the term 'private', and perhaps we should consider the issue more in terms of diverse 
forms of state funding. To realise the possibilities that exist significant changes would 
be required in how government budgets for education are made up and regulated. 
(c) Alternative Provision of Goods and Services 
Many countries have now contracted the publishing of school books to private sector 
publishers, and are contracting teachers and others to work on curriculum development, 
in contrast to previous reliance on Ministry of Education units to do this work. There 
has been less experimentation in some of the other parts of the education service, 
particularly in high cost areas such as the training of teachers. As teachers make up the 
single greatest cost component of primary and secondary education, and, at the same 
time, in nearly all countries perceive themselves to be underpaid and working in poor 
environments, a prime concern must be to improve their conditions. To achieve this 
they must (a) have more capital to work with (better buildings, books and equipment, 
etc); and (b) in most countries have improved salaries. Yet because teachers are in most 
cases only supplied by government which is constrained by public expenditure ceilings, neither of these improvements are likely to be achievable in most Sub-Saharan African 
countries in the near future. 
In addition, the cost of teachers to schools is fixed by centrally determined norms, 
expressed both in salary scales and levels of qualification. In many countries the 
problems of poor quality in schools are also found in teacher training institutions, and 
the professional capability of teachers suffers. Put another way, although teachers may 
possess appropriate paper qualifications attesting to years of training, they are not 
axiomatically well-trained teachers. This would explain to a large degree the findings of 
researchers which suggest that the level of training of teachers may not be significantly 
associated with pupil performance in many countries, particularly in primary schools.48 
Any discussion of education fees and private schooling in Africa is likely to end 
indeterminately as most countries have little experience of the complex interaction 
between household and government expenditures and the quality of educational 
provision. The relevance of the issue to public budgeting is the need for planners to 
determine the amount of private finance available to supplement government finance at 
all levels, and to determine the effects of the distribution of subsidies on the availability 
of education to all income groups. The foregoing brief discussion of approaches to 
augmenting the resources which are available to support the development of 
educational systems highlights the problems facing planners in the implementation of 
the proposed 'new priorities'. While several key policy targets are proposed, they are 
often based upon assumptions that have not yet been tested and which have a number of 
practical difficulties attached to them. Countries should not accept such policy advice 
without giving careful thought to how it should be initiated and tested. This involves 
setting place the appropriate mechanisms to allow them to do so effectively. 
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A. Issues in planning and budget reform 
The approaches discussed in this part of the paper arise directly out of the analysis of 
issues in Part I. They are concerned primarily with the question of how to achieve 
sustainable reform of education systems through better use of domestic resources 
combined with focused applications of foreign aid. I argue that a key reason for the 
whole or partial failure of many initiatives, whether they be related to financing 
education, to the introduction of curriculum reforms, to the improvement of teacher 
quality, or to the introduction of greater participation of communities in schooling, to 
name four common reform targets, has been the neglect of budgeting processes. This 
neglect has now become critical because of the inability of most budget systems to cope 
adequately with contraction. 
The problems addressed in this paper are not new, as I have noted. It has long been 
recognised that available resources have been spread more and more thinly over more 
students at the expense of quality and effectiveness. In spite of this, answers to how 
plans and resources should be related have rarely been addressed in technical detail. 
While, for example, the first IIEP Fundamentals of Education Planning monograph 
published in 197049 specifically proposed reforms to budgeting and related techniques, 
training courses and technical literature did not take these proposals forward. Part of the 
reason was that during the 1970s economic and political conditions were such that in 
many countries, supported by foreign aid, there was little perceived need to make the 
necessary changes. In anglophone ax-colonies the same budget systems as were 
implanted in colonial times are still in use. 
The Educational Budget. The budget is the most significant influence on sectoral 
planning and management, and is the most comprehensive policy document issued by 
Government. That budgeting needs to be improved is generally recognised in the aid 
literature, although there appears to have been little academic interest expressed in the subject in professional journals, but less well understood are the difficulties in altering 
significantly the structure of planning and budgeting in one sector only. It is necessary 
to take into account the changes needed in the entire system of which the education 
sector is a part. Otherwise fundamental incompatibilities will exist between sectoral and 
Treasury formats. The result of the failure to change the structures of planning and 
budgeting has meant that exhortations to achieve greater efficiency cannot be 
effectively translated into practice. 
Furthermore, discussions of planning and budgeting cannot concentrate solely on 
recurrent budgeting alone, as has so often been the case. Capital budgets, in some 
countries replaced by 'development'50 budgets, is a crucial aspect of the planning 
process, as is the need to account effectively for the use of foreign aid. In some 
countries foreign aid represents a significant proportion of total government education 
expenditure in itself, while in others the volume may be low relative to total spending 
although its influence on policy may be significant. I outline below the different types 
of budgeting, followed by a consideration of the approaches to budgetary and planning 
reform which are, I suggest, necessary conditions for sectoral reform. 
Types of Budgeting. Budget techniques and processes can be placed at different points 
on a continuum which ranges from incremental approaches at one end to programme 
and zero-based budgeting at the other. Incremental systems are used in public 
budgeting in most countries and take as their starting point the budget and sometimes 
the actual expenditure for the previous year. These systems tend to be departmental in 
their objectives. Rational51 systems relate budgets to objectives and take into account 
wider objectives which cut across departments and institutions. The problem is 
therefore to combine the ideal with the practical. 
(a) Incremental Budgeting Systems 
Most current systems are in an incremental bid format based on line items in the budget 
categories. Separate ministries, departments and institutions prepare the next year's 
estimates in isolation from each other, adopting as their base point the current year's 
volume of services and expenditure levels. These estimates take the form of bids, as in 
an auction, and when they are aggregated they inevitably exceed the amount available 
to finance them. In an efficient bid system departments then adopt a systematic 
approach to reducing their bids. In most African countries teacher salary budgets are 
largely inviolate, and last minute reductions in non-salary budgets are imposed by 
Ministries of Finance, often with no consultation with the bidders. Control of sorts is 
exerted over salaries merely by allowing them to decline in real terms, although if total 
budgets also decline in real terms the proportion of salaries in the budgets remains 
constant.52 Disadvantages of Incremental Budgeting. This system suffers from many 
disadvantages: 
(a) It cannot cope with reviews of the base budget, and consequently 
bidders are unlikely to propose reductions. The objective for each bidder 
is to maximise the bid, and the strongest available argument is the 
volume of the base year's expenditures, which consequently must be 
maintained even if they are unnecessary, in the case of underspent 
allocations. 
(b) It encourages a fragmented, departmental approach, in which public 
departments which have common objectives bid against each other, even 
when their aims are related. This fragmentation in its extreme forms is 
manifested by different departments bidding against each other for 
exactly the same purpose.53 
(c) It takes no account of objectives, but emphasises financial control of 
inputs. The bureaucratic imperative is to keep within budget, but no 
attempt is made to evaluate the effectiveness of the expenditure in 
achieving agreed goals. A continuing and idealised relationship between 
inputs and outcomes is assumed: as long as the money is spent the 
desired outcome is assumed to be achieved. 
(d) It encourages a short term view. Budgets are annual exercises. Where 
capital budgeting is concerned there is no room for estimating 
incremental recurrent budget implications, and the planning horizon is 
short.
Advantages of Incremental Systems. The principal advantage of the incremental 
systems, and the reason for their robustness in the face of their deficiencies, is that they 
are readily amenable to the political process of negotiation.54 The base is not 
challenged, and disputes can therefore be focused on the incremental proposals, which 
in the education sector can be conveniently divided between salary and non-salary 
expenditures, the former being politically more sensitive than the latter. Incremental 
budgeting encourages compromise and the mitigation of conflict. Sometimes the 
political process creates pressure for the increase of a line item precisely because of the 
fixed nature of the base: a common example of this is boarding costs for secondary 
school pupils. The final decisions on the budget, whether from the Ministries of 
Finance or from political sources, are invariably removed from the budget managers, 
who may be among the last to be notified, and hence there is little room for conflict. 
The political dimension cannot be ignored. The failure of many budget reforms had its roots in the resistance of political authorities to reviewing and cutting programmes 
which in some way would threaten their positions or even government stability.55 The 
result has been, however, a progressive deterioration of education systems in times of 
financial stringency, as no means have been available to adapt services to available 
resources. 
(b) 'Rational' Budgeting Systems 
The combination of more or less fixed base budgets and concern with quantities of 
throughput rather than with quality and quantity of output must be characterised as an 
irrational combination for planning and budgeting purposes in the sense that the level 
and allocation of resources are not derived from a reasoned consideration of relative 
priorities. 'Rational' forms of budgeting require that the justification of each item of 
expenditure be related to a target output, itself related to an overall policy goal or set of 
goals for the education sector and for the economy as a whole. 
Programme Budget Systems. At the other extreme from bid budgeting are Planning 
Programming Budgeting Systems (PPBS), referred to here generally as Programme 
Budgeting (PB).56 Although budgets are, in principle, plans expressed in financial 
terms, in practice, particularly in government budgeting, their construction may become 
divorced from specific objectives and targets and become driven by other criteria. 
Programme Budgeting is basically an approach to the formulation of plans and budgets 
where attention is focused on objectives, and activities are grouped into 'programmes' 
each one of which is concerned with a single objective.57 In a company this approach is 
an alternative to departmental budgeting where each department of the organisation 
makes a budget. Instead, planning and budgetary control may cut across departments 
where each department is concerned with a part of a programme. The application of the 
approach to government budgeting may or may not alter expenditure control 
mechanisms, but will affect how the budget is built up and how the activities on which 
the budget is based are monitored. 
The mechanics of PB are broadly as follows: 
(a) Establish sectoral policies with overall goals broken down into 
programmes with defined objectives, sub-objectives and activities; 
(b) Analyse programmes in terms of 
(i) identification and quantification of resources required to 
meet objectives 
(ii) existing resource allocations (iii) identification of alternative ways of achieving the 
objectives derived from needs analysis 
(iv) comparative quantitative and qualitative evaluation of 
alternatives and their social and economic costs and 
benefits;
(c) Prepare budgets on the basis of the analysis, with narrative statements 
of output measures and justification; 
(d) Feedback and review.
Zero-Based Budgeting. A form, which in some ways is less extreme and in others more, 
is Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB), which requires that the total cost of every item 
included in a budget be justified and approved. No base or minimum expenditure for 
any activity or budget line is automatically acceptable. The approach forces an 
evaluation of all expenditures and their associated activities. ZBB seeks to expose 
functions and goals which may have exhausted their usefulness. 
In its purest form PPBS is a limited technique because of its complexity. It was 
introduced into US and UK public budgeting58 in the 1960s and 70s, but its attractions 
began to fade. There are practical problems in allocating activities to programmes and 
developing accounting systems that cut across departments. There is considerable 
potential for conflict as base budgets are regularly reviewed. Within government 
structures it is difficult to encourage multi-disciplinary approaches, particularly if it 
means a reduction in the volume of activity in a department in order to rationalise. 
Finally, there is a danger of policy instability and frequent major changes, often 
occurring because planners were wrong in their initial assumptions and forecasts. They 
became replaced by systems which retained elements of PB, with enhanced capability 
for regular value for money surveys of programmes and improved virement systems. 
As with PPBS, ZBB is impractical as a standard system. It is not in general physically 
possible to subject programmes and activities to annual reviews of their base 
assumptions. It is, however, possible to establish ad hoc mechanisms for scrutinising 
the base, such as value for money studies. These, together with elements of PB, form 
the basis of a system of practical budgeting which is feasible in its aims and techniques, 
and flexible in its mechanisms. Education planners will readily recognise the features of 
the system: they are the basis of effective planning. It is possible to develop approaches 
to budgeting which take account of the strengths and limitations of each system and of 
political and bureaucratic realities. In brief, the overall objective of any reform to 
budgeting must be to combine the planning function with the budgeting function, and to subject financial allocations to proper scrutiny of the activities which they support. New 
budgeting and planning procedures must retain the virtues of the traditional systems 
while at the same time they must reduce its defects. 
Advantages of Programme Budgeting. There are two key advantages of the programme 
approach to the budgeting of public resources. First, it demands by its very nature 
participatory planning and policy making from the bottom up, and it hence makes the 
allocation of public resources more democratic. This is important when resources are 
inadequate: public dissatisfaction can be minimised if there is a broad consensus on 
their disposition, and enhanced transparency creates a better atmosphere for the 
introduction of cost-sharing. Secondly, plans can be monitored, and budget control 
ceases to be limited to ensuring that financial ceilings are not breached. It provides a 
means of short term monitoring of targets which can only be achieved if the resources 
allocated to them are realistic in the first place. In other words, plans are directly related 
to available resources. 
Effective budgeting depends on good estimates of what resources are available. Under 
incremental budgeting, even if budget ceilings are given in advance, institutions within 
the system still benefit from trying to bargain higher shares, with the main arguments 
revolving around their previous allocations. The reduction of the volume of activities to 
be supported by the budget is rarely an option. Institutional planners may build up their 
budget bids on, for example, numbers of pupil places, books required, etc. but these 
bids are rarely derived from a conscious prioritisation of activities, but rather from 
maintaining or improving the status quo. 
It is unlikely that a system which is based only on incremental budgeting can 
effectively incorporate a process of ranking activities in order of priority and costing 
them. This is made more difficult by the need to effect changes over periods of more 
than one year. For example, teachers' salaries have over the years in many countries 
become treated as fixed costs, and all other charges to the budgets are residual, yet 
everyone recognises the absurdity of employing people who cannot do their work 
because of inadequate facilities and equipment and who are inadequately paid. 
Education systems are major employers, and this makes restructuring difficult because 
of the human implications of reductions in the total system: it is difficult to plan a way 
out of the problem in the absence of immediately available and substantial additional 
resources. 
Financial Planning Systems. In order to overcome this problem, systems which may be 
described as 'financial planning' or 'volume planning' systems are increasingly 
employed. These are concerned with longer planning horizons, usually of three years, 
and are characterised by the advance provision of expenditure guidelines, joint capital 
and recurrent budgets and a more relevant budget specification and classification than 
the line item budgets described above. However, their focus is still primarily incremental and they do not involve a priori justification of the base budget. The 
emphasis is still a departmental one, and the same criticisms relating to the 
measurement of outcomes may apply. However, when considered on a rolling basis 
with programme budgets, they become powerful tools for medium term planning.
B. Implementing improved systems 
The main problem which in many cases seems almost insuperable without major 
political commitment is that rational budgeting techniques in education sectors cannot 
be introduced effectively without reforming total budget systems, across all sectors. 
The approach to realising reform is described below, and, as I argue, the approach must 
be at a reasonable pace. Its basic elements are: 
(a) the introduction of linked rolling plans and budgets, which involves: 
(i) strengthening macroeconomic forecasting for the 
purposes of overall government revenue estimation 
(ii) better estimation of domestic revenues for education 
(iii) identification of near-term education sector objectives
(b) strengthened decentralised processes in planning and budgeting, 
involving: 
(i) a more 'pyramidal' planning structure
(ii) identification of 'planning/cost centres' for planning and 
budgeting purposes
(c) the introduction of programme elements into budgets, which involves: 
(i) revisions of budget formats and classifications
(ii) identification of programmes
(d) reform in capital budgeting 
(e) better procedures for planning and reporting foreign aid grants and 
loans 
(f) improved expenditure estimation (g) more accountable budget implementation and improved expenditure 
control
(a) Rolling Plans and Budgets 
Rolling expenditure planning enables governments to have a medium-term perspective 
of the future financial obligations created by existing policies. A three year perspective 
is usually considered reasonable and feasible. Revenue and expenditure budgets are 
made for the current year and for the next two years, and as each year draws to a close, 
a new third year is added. Rolling plans should be distinguished from development 
plans, which are mainly concerned with new policies and interventions. They are not 
substitutes for annual budgeting, but are part of the process of preparing for annual 
budgets by setting indicative planning targets for the ministerial sectors. They allow 
sector planners to prepare forward estimates of their financial requirements which are 
then considered in relation to the predicted available resource ceiling. The technique 
allows time for sector planners to adjust their plans and expectations to resource 
constraints, and gives a certain degree of security about the future. In many ways, the 
adoption of medium term forward budgeting by its very nature pushes the system 
towards programme budgeting. Most of the policy reforms discussed in the first part of 
this paper need to be tested in the countries where they are introduced: experience in 
other countries may not necessarily be relevant, though some have more evidence of 
success than others. By establishing mechanisms whereby they can be tested without 
major disruptions governments will have greater flexibility to innovate and also insure 
against effects of failure. Data deficiencies can be remedied and policy makers alerted 
in good time to problems which may arise. Rolling planning and programme budgeting 
are essentially 'bottom-tip' in character, and the effects of policy changes can be 
evaluated within the normal planning process as managers respond to changes. 
Improved classification of revenue and expenditure can ensure that there is greater 
transparency in government budgeting, allowing inter alia the assumptions behind fee 
and local taxation systems to be tested adequately. 
Economic Forecasting. The common and conventional reaction of civil servants 
accustomed to the old British budget procedures is that government cannot safely 
predict what it will be able to spend next year, and therefore cannot make advance 
budgetary commitments. In many countries education sectoral allocations have 
sometimes not been approved until after the start of the fiscal year. While in some 
instances this is understandable, there is a certain absurdity to this view when 
considering education systems and the predictability of their base financing 
requirements: the main issue is by how much expenditure can be increased. It is 
possible to make reasonable predictions of government revenues over a three year 
period, and to make sufficient allocation to education to cover 'core' expenditure, and 
then to allow for under or over estimation which would mainly effect the rate of 
increase of education expenditure, perhaps through contingency budgeting. The revenue forecasts can be adjusted every year, and, of course, during the year. The 
assumptions on which they are based should also be made known so that sector 
planners can evaluate them and be prepared for changes. 
Estimation of Education Sector Revenues. Most education planners would prefer to 
have some indication of the likely future allocations to education to no indication at all. 
A weakness of line item budgeting is that it encourages planners to defend existing 
budget allocations rather than to seek better ways of allocating their revenues: if it 
becomes apparent that a particular line is no longer important it is difficult for planners 
to argue that they should keep the sums allocated for transfer to another line, which 
would then receive a proportionally greater increase than the 'normal' rate of increase. 
The base for education planning is enrolments in educational institutions: it is from 
these that all physical requirements derive. Enrolments can reasonably be predicted, 
although there is a surprising number of countries which do not have up to date and 
acceptably accurate enrolment data.59 The more certainty about the level of finance in 
the near future, the easier it is to plan realistically for institutional maintenance and 
growth, and also to programme significant changes in systems. Planning on an annual 
basis can be a barrier to change. 
If it is estimated pessimistically, any additional revenue expenditure can be 
contingently planned, on a percentage basis (for example, 20 per cent of any additional 
to forecast total revenue will be allocated to education), and/or against contingent 
budgets (if further resources become available, supplementary budgets which have 
already been drawn up are ready for implementation). At the end of each fiscal year 
plans and budgets are prepared for the 'new' third year, on the basis of the sectoral 
expenditure forecasts given for that year. Without the parallel introduction of rolling 
multi-annual budgeting it is likely that all budget processes will be pulled back to 
annual incrementalism. It may also be the case that some of the objections to 
incremental planning can be overcome by multiyear planning, thereby reducing the 
scope of necessary changes to the system.60 
Consolidated expenditure forecasts should distinguish sources of revenue. Thus 
government budgets alone may not reflect the full costs of the system, but obligations 
to finance the system fully must be defined in plans. If this is not done, policy decisions 
about relative allocations within the sector become meaningless. For example, if the 
university sector receives one half of its total revenues from domestic resources, and, 
say, the other half from foreign aid; and if the planned structure of total education 
expenditure indicates a desired proportion of university expenditure as being no more 
than 15 per cent of total expenditure; the government budget may reflect such a 
proportion, but in terms of total expenditure the proportion might reach, say, 25 per 
cent because of relative favouring of universities by foreign agencies. Once revenue forecasts for education are available, they need to be broken down to the sub-sectoral 
levels (primary, secondary, tertiary, etc); and then to the different planning/cost centres 
(see below). 
Medium-Term Sectoral Planning. Multi-year budgeting encourages medium-term 
sectoral planning. It should also discourage an excessive concern with long term 
vaguely quantified strategic plans (such as ten year plans), which are necessary, but 
which should be relatively short statements of policy and intent. The failure of most 
African countries to sustain progress in achieving plans is sufficient warning of the 
inadequacy of the long term planning approach. The three year plans will be the 
expression of the detailed direction of the system. If revenues are on a falling trend, 
then planners are in a position to plan for retraction (or lack of expansion) rather than 
wait for a suddenly imposed regime of expenditure cutbacks. 
(b) Improving the Planning System 
A necessary condition for the introduction of better planning and budgeting is 
improvement of the processes of plan formulation. Under the current systems in most 
countries, Ministries of Finance in the end are the real policy makers, particularly in 
times of contraction. There is little point in improving the processes because in most 
cases the work which goes into developing budgets is wasted when the final budget 
hearings take place. In other words, planners and the people on whose behalf they are 
supposed to plan are disenfranchised and subject to last minute arbitrary decisions. This 
has become a way of life and is accepted with resigned fatalism. 
Planning and budgeting should not be passive tasks. Plans and budgets need to be 
implemented, and accountability for implementation should rest on those who have 
formulated them. Many, if not most, systems tend to divorce the planner from 
implementation, and in top-down systems such as those in most African countries, 
planners (and politicians) make decisions for others to implement without extended and 
real consultation. Strengthening educational planning and budgeting would include the 
introduction of a pyramidal structure of planning and budgeting which would involve 
all relevant players in the process. 
The obvious basic unit of planning activity is the education institution. At the primary 
level the school might in principle be considered as a centre of activity, although 
primary schools would probably not be feasibly translated into planning/cost centres (a 
cluster system would be more effective). In many countries this is not dissimilar to 
earlier education systems which emphasised local control. At the secondary level it is 
more feasible to introduce an element of school based budgeting and planning. 
Pyramidal Planning Structures. In a system which contains a number of layers in the planning and budgeting pyramid, a longer budget time horizon allows planners to 
devolve many planning functions. Over time more and more disaggregated budget 
centres could be informed of the resources available to them on a three year rolling 
basis. The experience of voluntary agencies working in basic education, for example, 
demonstrates the feasibility of allowing village committees how to decide to allocate 
given sums of money. The shape of the system is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Pyramidal Structure of Education Planning and Budgeting 
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A strength of this approach lies in the legitimation of the allocation of reduced and 
insufficient finance for given activities: if communities and institutions can decide how 
to spend their limited resources rather than have it decided for them they are arguably 
more likely to 'own' their schools and institutions and contribute to their development. 
There are some important implications of the approach at the school level, most 
particularly relating to the training, recruitment and payment of teachers. 
The heterogeneity of education systems must also be recognised. Approaches to 
budgeting at primary, secondary and post-secondary levels should differ, and be related 
to accountability for budget implementation. While in rural areas primary schools are 
community institutions, secondary schools and urban primary schools are often less 
community based: in these cases school governance becomes an issue. Universities are 
in many ways the easiest institutions in which to initiate budget reform, and they lend 
themselves well to programme linked budgeting, although experience suggests political 
rather than practical difficulties work against such reform. 
Thus, a key feature of the eventual system would be the final realisation of participation 
of school communities in decisions about the allocation of subsidies: this has been a paper policy in many countries for a long time. For example, primary teachers may fail 
to arrive at their postings because of the absence of accommodation, remoteness, and 
other factors. Many school buildings are in a state of collapse. Over time the teaching 
profession becomes demoralised by a persistent lack of resources, low pay and difficult 
conditions, and no amount of training and exhortation will be effective. The mistake is 
to believe that planners and educationists can always decide what diverse communities 
want to do about the problem. At the moment, for example, when the teacher does not 
arrive at post, the salary is clawed back by the Treasury. The school has effectively lost 
a significant part of its budget. This is because of the bureaucratic division between 
salaries and non salary costs, which could be modified under a reformed budget system. 
There is no a priori reason why funds budgeted for salaries cannot be vired to provide a 
better environment, or buy materials, or in any other way enhance the quality of school 
life. 
Planning/Cost Centres. At present most countries have a structure of district education 
offices and local government, and it is usually possible to allocate revenues between 
them. These are in effect 'cost centres' for primary education and sometimes secondary 
education. At the post secondary levels budgeting is usually done at the institutional 
level. Under a rolling plan system cost centres can be given a reasonably firm allocation 
for the next year as well as indicative allocations for the subsequent two years. As 
planning capacity is extended and strengthened at district and local authority levels, the 
districts themselves can create further cost centres, as shown in figure 1. 
(c) Programming the Budget 
I have noted that the main reasons for the failure of programme budgeting to be widely 
adopted lie in the difficulties that political and institutional authorities have in 
reexamining the base budget, and in the complex ways in which the technique has 
tended to be introduced.61 An examination of the programme budget formats which 
have been tried confirms that they have required a great amount of skill and time. It 
should be noted that many of the recorded attempts to introduce programme budgeting 
did not take place in the framework of forward expenditure planning on a rolling basis. 
However, programme budgeting should not be regarded as a fixed system: there is no 
'right' approach (see the box for an outline description of the main elements). Indeed, 
the paucity of experience in the application of its techniques ensures that every 
approach to its introduction will be original, which may have the advantage of ensuring 
that it is locally relevant. One major difference between the experiences of many 
countries in the recent past and now is the rapid diffusion of micro-computers over the 
last decade, particularly the last five years. Its introduction should be gradual and be 
accompanied by intensive training within the contexts of the institutional changes 
described above.62 I do not propose major upheavals in budgeting and planning. Experience suggests that the success of past attempts to introduce programme 
budgeting is more to be found in improved practices after the 'pure' technique is 
abandoned, rather than in major permanent change to the financial system as a whole.63 
It is for this reason that I emphasise in this paper the need for improved planning as it 
relates to financial requirements to support plans, rather than propose a set technocratic 
solution. Elements of the budget can be programmed, and education budgets lend 
themselves to this approach, for a number of reasons, including the following: 
(a) a large component can be centrally managed, such as teachers' salaries 
(although ways of introducing flexibility into teacher recruitment and 
posting should be sought); 
(b) the relation of teachers and the associated 'capital' (books, materials, 
classrooms, etc) they require is relatively easy to determine; 
(c) some components of the budget, such as universities, colleges and 
large schools, can themselves programme their institutional budgets, 
which can still be presented in the sectoral budget estimates as lump sum 
line items; 
(d) similarly, decentralisation of budget formulation (eg to districts) can 
involve programme budgeting at the decentralised level, with a simplified 
presentation to the Ministry of Education, thence to Finance.
Budget classification is at the heart of programme budgeting (see box). The main 
problems arise when expenditure classifications become too complex, but it is possible 
to avoid this problem by not being too ambitious in the design of the system, as I have 
noted. It should always be borne in mind that the basic purpose of programme 
budgeting is to relate plans to resources and then enable planners to evaluate outcomes 
by stating objectives, goals and targets, and relating outcomes to the resources used to 
achieve them. 
The easy availability of micro-computers and accessible software allows a great deal of 
flexibility in budget construction. It is possible to build up programme budgets without 
affecting expenditure control and accounting systems, one of the main problems 
experienced in past attempts to programme budgets. Budget codes enable budget items 
to be 'cross-walked' from programme budgets into line item formats. The computer 
programming required is not complex. The development of the system can thus take 
place over time, and it is not necessary to overturn the line item format in order to 
introduce programme budgeting. The extent to which the easy availability of computers 
takes risk out of budget reform is not fully appreciated. An Outline Description of Programme Budgeting 
The education system as a whole is broken down into 'programmes'. These might 
simply be 'primary education', 'secondary education, 'technical education', 'higher 
education', 'special education', and so on. One programme might be the maintenance 
of the existing system. Each programme is broken down into objectives and sub-
objectives. Objectives might be 'curriculum development', or 'reduction of early 
leaving', or 'instructional programmes' or 'support programmes' They can be very 
close to existing classifications in many instances. A sub-objective of 'curriculum 
development' might be 'new maths materials'. Objectives are in turn made up of 
activities. It should be noted that one of the most common problems is to avoid 
double counting: for example, an activity in the sub-objective 'new maths materials' 
might be the training of teachers, which could itself be another objective. To achieve 
a specified objective a number of activities may be undertaken which cut across 
departmental boundaries, such as would occur with a sub-programme 'increase girls' 
participation' in the programme 'primary education'. 
The budget should relate to Government policies and goals, and therefore the 
justification for spending must be tied to these policies and goals, contained in the 
narrative statement for each activity. Goals cannot normally be achieved in one year, 
so that annual targets (or attainable goals) are necessary. The target must be a 
quantitative expression of policy, and any programme may have more than one target. 
Activities would tend to have one target. It must be possible to monitor targets. 
Expected outputs would be specified. Plans would therefore need to be broken down 
into a series of annual work programmes which can be accomplished with available 
resources. 
There are likely to be significant variations in approach to budget reform at the 
different education levels. Universities and large secondary schools, for example, can 
prepare institutional programme budgets64, while at the primary level budgets are 
likely to cover the whole sub-sector.
The introduction of programme budgeting to education should be governed by a 
number of broad principles. First, it should be slow and be piloted in selected 
regions/districts. Second, programmes should be broad at first, thus changing the 
minimum amount of the current formats. Third, the principle of relating plans to 
budgets and vice versa should apply to all main expenditure heads: in other words, 
programme budgeting should at least cover a part of all main spending. At the same 
time the type of budget process which is being aimed at should be defined, even if it 
takes many years to get there. Above all, experience suggests that reform of budgeting 
systems in one sector alone will create tensions with the Ministry of Finance systems, 
and that this will erode the effectiveness of the reform: financial systems must change overall. 
Budget Formats and Classifications. As I have noted, budget classifications must be 
able to reflect the rolling forward expenditure plans. The purpose of classification is to 
make government operations transparent and to render them amenable to economic 
analysis. Under incremental budget systems the most that can be said about education 
sector budgets relates to issues such as the balance between salary and non-salary 
budgeted expenditures, or the 'low' expenditure on supplies. Sector 'overheads', such as 
planning and administration, cannot easily be analysed. The budget gives very little 
idea of what is actually happening in the system. 
Revenue classifications should distinguish different sources of revenue, such as revenue 
from fees (both direct and through loan recovery), foreign aid (analysed between grants 
and loans), local taxes, and so on. Both revenue and expenditure classifications should 
distinguish between capital and recurrent finance. At the same time capital and 
recurrent classifications should be standardised: capital expenditure should be included 
in programmes alongside recurrent expenditure, and the budget codes should be the 
same. This goes a long way towards avoiding the problems that arise from double-
budgeting. For example, if sub-programme 230 is 'curriculum development', resource 
centres to be constructed under the capital programme would have the same sub-
programme code as recurrent expenditures for, say, salaries of curriculum developers. 
In this way all expenditures associated with curriculum development would be 
transparent, and the relation between capital spending and associated future recurrent 
finance requirements would be clear. 
(d) Capital Budgeting 
In general, capital expenditure is an outlay which is of value in the provision of benefits 
beyond the end of the year of account. This does not imply that capital expenditure is 
by definition 'developmental' while recurrent expenditure is not. Capital expenditure 
can either be made out borrowed funds or out of internal, or 'own', funds. It has been 
long recognised that capital expenditures in education systems in developing countries 
have resulted in an expansion of assets which cannot always be maintained or replaced, 
and which have had considerable finance costs. Foreign aid has contributed 
significantly to capital expenditure, as I have noted. Most existing approaches to 
accounting for capital expenditure are based on the analysis of loan principal and 
interest. Where capital expenditure is financed by 'own' funds or by grants it appears in 
the accounts only in the year in which it was made, as there are no interest costs 
attached to it. More usually, perhaps, foreign aid grant expenditure does not appear at 
all in capital accounts. 
The costs of public sector services are therefore linked to financing decisions and not the actual use of assets in providing those services. As loan repayments and interest 
costs are not included in the education sector budgets, the costs of asset use are not 
included in calculations of educational costs, as I discussed in the first part of this 
paper. Even were loan repayments to be included in the sector budget, where the main 
source of capital finance is grants there would be no entries for finance costs. Fixed 
assets are, to the education sector managers, debt free, and this explains much of the 
poor accountability for asset stocks. 
In general, the acquisition of a fixed asset brings with it three elements of direct 
expenditure: the initial outlay; the maintenance of the asset through its lifetime; and the 
interest expense where the asset is financed through borrowing: where it is financed 
through grant aid or 'own' funds, a common practice in public authorities in developed 
countries is to apply notional finance costs. Of course, the indirect cost of grant aid is 
the alternative use of the finance, which, in reality, may not be an option, as in the case 
of tied aid. 
The main differences between capital budgeting in the private and public sectors is that 
in the private sector provision is made for depreciation of fixed assets, ensuring that the 
profit and loss account bears a charge for the use of the asset, and that distributable 
profit takes this charge into account. Depreciation is the measure of the reduction of the 
economic life of the asset as it wears out or is consumed. It should be allocated so as to 
charge a fair proportion of the cost or valuation of the asset to each accounting period 
expected to benefit from its use. Depreciation allowances reflect both the charges for 
the use of the asset and for maintaining the capital in the business intact. Public sector 
assets are not normally depreciated. The consequence of this is that the costs of services 
are not separated from decisions about how they are financed and that there is no 
provision for asset replacement. 
Although the public sector has traditionally not depreciated assets, there is considerable 
interest in a number of countries in this issue. In the UK, for example, local authorities 
are being recommended to change the way they account for assets, including the 
introduction of depreciation charges.65 This will involve the standardisation of asset 
lives: for example, schools are given a 50 year life, furniture 15 years and vehicles 3-8 
years. All assets are to be valued at replacement cost (unless they are to be 
discontinued, such as a school closing down). 
There are compelling reasons why the introduction of better capital accounting might 
not be feasible in African countries, including its potential complexity, the difficulty of 
valuing many assets, and the lack of working accounting procedures. However, there 
has been in many countries an undoubted tendency to create assets which cannot be 
replaced or maintained, particularly when they are financed through external grant 
funds. The introduction of depreciation accounting in public budgets would create a 
register of assets and asset values; and ensure through the budget the proper provision for asset replacement.66 
There are two categories of conclusion from the foregoing discussion. The first is that 
education authorities in most African countries have little incentive to protect the value 
of assets and make provision for their replacement. The second is that they are not 
involved in the management of finance costs, and therefore have little interest in them. 
Ways of tackling these problems should be sought which suit the systems of individual 
countries. Where, for example, management is devolved upon local governments, local 
accounting systems could be strengthened over time to the point where they can 
produce balance sheets showing asset values. In most countries such a time is probably 
far off, though education sector institutions, such as universities and autonomous 
colleges, should keep proper capital accounts. 
The budgeting and accounting conventions to be applied to private schools could 
include the requirement that revenue accounts bear a charge for depreciation. This 
should certainly apply to those instances where private secondary schools receive 
grants of public money to finance capital assets. A condition should be that they present 
their yearly audited accounts to show that proper provision is made for asset 
replacement. This would impose discipline on expenditures and help to create reserves. 
Programme budgeting requires that the purchase, maintenance and replacement of 
assets acquired through domestic or foreign finance be included in the budget for each 
programme. Most capital expenditure programmes such as school building and 
equipment, or even textbook 'programmes' take place over several years. Under a 
rolling system future capital replacement requirements can be foreseen and built into 
the future budget. At the institutional level it may be possible to introduce procedures 
so that reserves can be built up over time for asset purchase.67 
The concepts of capital maintenance and replacement are central to the achievement of 
sustainable systems. While in many countries they are almost irrelevant because of the 
acute underfunding in recurrent budgets, it is important that discipline be imposed. 
Depreciation accounting is the standard and effective way of encouraging good use of 
assets, and, although it may not be a viable alternative for many years in most African 
countries, the concepts which underlie it should be carefully considered when building 
new budget systems. There is a good case for aid 'donors' to take more interest in how 
the assets they have helped to finance are protected. 
(e) Budgeting Accounting Foreign Aid 
I have noted that foreign aid has played and is playing a major part in the development 
of the education systems in many countries, and that a good deal of aid is not included 
in normal government budgeting and accounting systems. There are several reasons for this, including the lack of confidence of many 'donors' in government financial 
procedures and the significant amount of foreign aid which is purchased outside the 
recipient country, such as technical assistance and certain goods. Advantages to 
recipients of keeping aid out of normal budget processes include access to flexible 
funds which bypass government budget controls. In many countries aid in the form of 
balance of payments support is increasingly important, and has brought with it its own 
problems, including those associated with the use of, and accounting for, counterpart 
funds.68 However, sound budgeting must be comprehensive, and all government 
revenues should be paid into, and all expenditures paid out of, a single Consolidated 
Fund. While this state of affairs may, in the case of foreign aid budgeting and 
expenditure, be difficult to achieve, it should, as in the case of better capital budgeting 
and accounting, be a target. 
External assistance to education brings with it three inherent dangers. The first is that it 
encourages expansion beyond the capability of domestic resources to service the 
expansion. The second danger is the encouragement of inappropriate technology and 
structures, and the third is the resulting rise in expectations accompanied by a 
dependence on 'donors'. All of these can create an excessive dependence on foreign 
resources to maintain the system unless foreign aid is planned for in a rational manner 
to fit into existing priorities. 
Foreign Aid and Education Expansion. General literature on foreign aid69 tends to 
concentrate on agriculture, water supply, industry, and sectors where outputs can be 
relatively easily measured. Where education is discussed it is in terms of physical 
achievement which is invariably expansionary. Rising enrolment rates are assumed to 
be a positive achievement, and a well-educated population is assumed to be a necessary 
condition for economic growth. Whether these assumptions are fair or not, an important 
characteristic of the education sector is usually ignored: it is in most countries the single 
greatest item of public expenditure after defence. Expansion of education provision 
almost always means an increase in public spending. 
The seemingly easy availability of development finance encouraged countries to 
experiment and accept foreign initiatives with little thought to their sustainability or 
appropriateness. Foreign finance promoted the expansion of education systems to the 
point where they sought to reach all sections of the populations, which became 
accustomed to the idea of universal provision. At the same time the expectations of 
education managers were raised while, in many cases, they concurrently became to 
greater or lesser degrees de-skilled because of the tendency for 'donors' to design 
programmes themselves and for hierarchical and authoritarian civil service structures to 
ignore local managerial staff. 
In some countries external assistance comprises nearly all the 'development' expenditure in education sectors, although there may be little apparent relationship 
between 'development' expenditure and recurrent budgets, a relationship which is to be 
expected because each new investment should carry with it additional recurrent 
obligations. Development programmes have tended to be adjusted to a level permitted 
by available foreign exchange, and additional resources for meeting local costs have 
often had to come from inflationary sources.70 Expansion of education sectors appears 
to have been frequently determined solely by the availability of foreign exchange from 
foreign aid, with little reference to what each country can afford to maintain from its 
own fiscal resources. The alternative is to deploy external assistance at a reasonable 
level to support domestic deficits, and of course, in the case of foreign loan finance, to 
support debt repayment. 
In many countries the proportion of foreign aid accounted for by the costs of technical 
assistance is around one quarter of the total, and in some the total expenditures on 
technical assistance exceed the civil service salary bill.71 Technical assistance is rarely 
passed through or reported in budgets. While some countries insisted that technical 
assistance be integrated into the public service, over the years agencies required that 
their projects operated autonomously, outside 'normal' structures. Failure to account for 
the expenditures on technical assistance distorts many cost analyses in the education 
sector: examples include curriculum development and higher education. 
A key issue is therefore for countries to regain, where they have lost it wholly or in 
part, control over education systems and their future development. One of the necessary 
conditions of doing so is to improve budgeting and accounting for foreign aid. The first 
step is to ensure that aid to the education sector reflects sector priorities. The best way 
to identify priorities is to consider what they would be in the absence of foreign aid, in 
other words, how the sector would be planned for on the basis of domestic resources 
only. Domestic resource planning and budgeting does not necessarily imply that 
countries should try to dispense entirely with external assistance. It is a way of 
encouraging planners and managers to identify core funding requirements of the 
sector.72 
Underfunding. 'Underfunding' has tended to express the finance gap between a 
reasonable level of funding for the education services that actually exist and the 
available resources to support them. The concept excludes by implication any reduction 
in the scope of services, and is used as a justification for external assistance to support 
existing systems in order to avoid restructuring. A better way of looking at the finance 
gap would be in terms of the desired expansion of the system to provide a better and 
more comprehensive service. I have already noted the example of Universal Primary 
Education, where, instead of planning for a sustainable increase in enrolments, 
governments (and aid 'donors') encouraged through positive measures a rapid increase 
which could not be supported, forcing themselves to seek yet more external funding. The same applies to the expansion of higher education in many countries. Thus, core 
funding should relate to the fiscal capacity of the country to support its education 
system, rather than to what is required to finance an extensive system modeled, for 
example, on the best characteristics of those which exist now in developed countries. 
External assistance can then be applied with circumspection to develop the system. 
Each programme's foreign aid component should be identified separately where 
possible, and the rolling three year budget should show how the component will be 
sustained, One approach to the introduction of programme budgeting would be to 
programme all components of the education sector which benefit from foreign aid. In 
many countries the introduction of such a system would show in a very short time the 
extent to which externally financed initiatives cannot be sustained. It may be possible 
for education planners to indicate a ceiling for foreign aid in any period: this could be, 
for example, a rule of thumb ratio of aid to the domestic resource ceiling.73 It is clear 
that these changes cut across all sectors, and cannot be limited to education ministries. 
They rely on leadership and cooperation by Ministries of Finance, including, for 
example, the development of manuals of instruction to sector planners on how to treat 
foreign aid. They also rely on cooperation by donors, both to pass the funds through the 
budget as policy and budget practices improve, and in the analysis and evaluation of 
current projects.74 
(f) Improving Expenditure Estimation 
Irrespective of the changes to the budget format, techniques of budget estimation will in 
most countries need to be strengthened. Estimation should be simpler under rolling 
programme formats because activities are more clearly set out and because the iterative 
process of relating estimates to available resources enables budgeters to adapt their 
estimates. A commonly recommended approach is the use of 'norms' and formulae. 
This involves establishing quantities required to achieve given objectives, such as 
average ratios of books to pupils across subjects, the number of pupils per teacher, the 
number of teachers per various types of allowance, and so on. While in many respects 
these are desirable, they can also promote overestimation and a loss of flexibility, and 
the approach has many disadvantages in annual incremental budgeting systems. Many 
countries in which norms are given to education ministries by finance ministries find 
that their norm-based budgets are disregarded at the last minute-by the finance 
ministries in the process of budget reduction. The requirement to budget to norms has 
little point if they are not respected. Another problem with norm-based budgeting is that 
norms become fixed and inflexible. For example, as book procurement and distribution 
capacity develops, textbook-student ratios can increase. The current tendency is to fix 
'ideal' norms and then aim at them, rather than to set realistic ones and achieve them. A 
related problem is the existence of conditions which make the achievement of norms 
almost impossible, for example, where universities try to achieve efficient staffing 
levels starting from a position of over-staffing. Where the estimation process is more effectively iterative a more flexible approach is 
possible. Norms can be adapted and changed as required. Managers are in a better 
position to define their requirements in terms of what they want to achieve rather than 
in terms of fixed quantities prescribed for them. Furthermore, variations in what can be 
provided outside the government budget can be taken into account: if desks, or chalk, 
are easily available locally then they can be provided by schools and the savings be 
applied elsewhere in the system. 
Thus the estimation process cannot be separated from the allocation process. While the 
use of norms is useful as part of the process of identifying total resources required, 
under programme budgeting with identified cost-centres schools or clusters of schools 
can eventually become the lowest unit of allocation. However this is done, whether by 
capitation grants or by other means, the integrity of the cost-centre budget and the right 
of its managers to allocate from it should be respected within reasonable guidelines. For 
example, while norm budgeting would specify fixed quantities of particular items for 
delivery to a school, parents and teachers in a primary school may wish to reallocate 
some of the money for chalk or desks to books, and should be allowed to do so. Such a 
process implies a degree of zero-based budgeting, which is a useful way of evaluating 
the effectiveness of norms. Ministries could run annual ZBB exercises on selected 
norms. 
(g) Expenditure Management and Accountability 
In many countries education ministry and some institutional accounts fail to receive 
auditors' approval. The reasons may be numerous. Rules and regulations of expenditure 
management may not be respected by concerned officials: payments are made against 
pro-forma invoices, without supporting vouchers, or without authorization; cash books 
are not maintained; bank reconciliations are not produced; stores are not recorded; the 
payroll includes ghost employees; and so on. The combination of lax expenditure 
controls, off-budget foreign aid and cash-starved finance ministries creates serious 
difficulties for education expenditure management to the extent that there may be up to 
three parallel budgets: that approved by the legislature; departmental and institutional 
budgets which include foreign aid as well as the legal budget; and a cash operated 
budget by the finance ministry concentrating on timely releases of the approved budget 
to education, sometimes failing to release the required amounts. 
Many expenditure management problems originate in poor budgeting, and the 
proposals outlined in previous paragraphs are designed to address these problems. 
Programme budgeting specifies more clearly who is responsible for budget 
implementation, and sector structures need to be adapted to reinforce accountability. 
Forward budgeting allows overspending to be adjusted against next year's budget, so that education ministry managers see clearly the effects of their actions on future 
releases. Initiatives to improve accounting, cash management and expenditure reporting 
must go hand in hand with improvements to budgeting, both in education ministries and 
in finance ministries, and aid 'donors' should take a keen interest in ensuring that these 
initiatives take place. Otherwise it will be unlikely that foreign aid will be passed 
through the budget.
C. Conclusions: Affordability and 
sustainability 
Phased Implementation. While revenue classification can be improved in a fairly short 
time, the reclassification of expenditures is more complex, as is the strengthening of 
capital and foreign aid budgeting. In the first part of this paper I emphasised that a 
necessary condition for the implementation of the reforms which have been proposed 
for education systems in Africa was the setting in place of appropriate management and 
planning mechanisms, and that this alone could take many years. Expansion policies 
such as Schooling For All and Universal Primary Education not only depend on 
resource availability but also on management capacity. I have also noted the constraints 
on domestic resources and the possible decrease in the levels of foreign aid available to 
Africa. 
'The Receding Managerial Limit'. 'Planning implies on the one hand a purpose, and on 
the other, the organization of resources to accomplish this purpose in some desired 
manner.'75 A key resource of any organisation is its management, and at any given time 
the capacities of the existing management staff set a limit to the expansion of the 
organisation. This paper has set out approaches to overcoming the problem of the 
'receding managerial limit',76 through improving the tools available for managers and 
the structures in which they work, but also by suggesting a different approach to 
marshalling the resources they have to hand. The constraints which apply to all other 
reform initiatives also apply to those suggested here. They must be phased in slowly. 
Sustainable Development. The concern with sustainable development has been brought 
to the fore by environmental concerns, where they relate to the impact of projects on, 
for example, national income, human welfare, depletion of physical resources and 
technological change. The criteria in these cases relate to irreversible effects of 
projects, how to foresee them, measure them, and accommodate or avoid theme In 
many respects the economics of the environment is similar to the economics of human 
resources, most particularly in their long term horizons, and the associated problems of 
valuing externalities. The essence of environmental economics has been the elaboration 
of techniques to value what was previously thought to be unevaluable. This may well 
be mirrored in educational analysis, as many of the current approaches encourage short-term viewpoints, as I have noted in Part I. While poor decisions in educational policy 
may well lead to irreversible damage, in the sense of opportunities lost, sustainability in 
a practical sense must mean the ability of countries to maintain education provision of 
reasonable quality with domestically generated resources: the ability to borrow and 
repay loans, and to maintain asset stocks is part of domestic capacity. 
Affordability. The title of this paper suggests that education is an unaffordable 
commodity. In relation to the total educational wants of a population this is probably by 
definition true. However, by concentrating on reforms and improvements which will 
result in a better fit between available resources, local management and professional 
capacity, and the scope and size of educational systems, African countries can afford 
better quality. These reforms and improvements cannot be restricted to the education 
sector alone, but must be undertaken parallel to improvements and reforms in 
Ministries of Finance and in civil services in general. Such an approach contrasts with 
expansionary approaches such as those of the Jomtien Conference which commit 
countries to build their education systems up further on weak foundations, and to follow 
this more cautious approach would be to heed the lessons of the last two decades, 
Policy Implications for Donors 
In this paper I have argued that most countries are likely to experience considerable 
difficulty in implementing simultaneously the triple initiatives of expenditure 
reallocation, improved budget management and system expansion. The main 
implication for donors of the types of policy I have proposed is the need to recognise 
that the pace of change is almost certain to be slow, in contrast with the aspirations of 
many donor initiatives, particularly those within the context of the social dimensions of 
structural adjustment. 
In particular, it is important that the availability of foreign aid does not encourage the 
unsustainable expansion of education systems, resulting in a serious deterioration of 
quality. The growing importance of programme aid and counterpart funding via balance 
of payments support has heightened awareness of the need for governments to improve 
policy as well as policy implementation processes, but donors should take care to avoid 
unrealistic prescriptions. At the same time, donors should reflect the introduction of 
rolling plan budgeting in aid policies, with longer term commitments of aid to be 
passed through budgets in order to give governments a better idea of what resources are 
likely to be available, of course within an acceptable and feasible planning framework. 
This would require a much better match of projects and educational policy than has 
hitherto been observable. 
At the level of programme design for the strengthening of planning and budgeting in 
the education sector a key lesson of the past is the need for coordination between sectoral ministries and ministries of finance. I have suggested that in most countries 
there is a need to improve overall public sector budgeting and that failing to do so will 
dilute the effect of improvements at the sectoral levels. Sectoral donors should take a 
wider view of their interventions. Many may consider this to be a daunting task, but I 
argue that a gradual process of reclassification of budget heads is possible and that there 
need be no conflict between the budget formats used by ministries of finance and 
education. When the mechanisms by which change may be effected are in place 
countries will be able to take effective steps to initiate affordable and sustainable 
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